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Law professors routinely accuse each other of making politically
biased arguments in their scholarship. They have also helped
produce a large empirical literature on judicial behavior that has
found that judicial opinions sometimes reflect the ideological biases
of the judges who join them. Yet no one has used statistical methods
to test the parallel hypothesis that legal scholarship reflects the
political biases of law professors. This paper provides the results of
such a test. We find that, at a statistically significant level, law
professors at elite law schools who make donations to Democratic
political candidates write liberal scholarship, and law professors who
make donations to Republican political candidates write conservative
scholarship. These findings raise questions about standards of
objectivity in legal scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
Law professors have frequently accused each other of writing
legal scholarship that claims to be objective but is in fact tainted with
political bias. Conservative law professors argue that liberal
constitutional scholars say that the Constitution protects abortion
rights and same-sex marriage but not gun rights because of their
ideological commitments to abortion, same-sex marriage, and gun
control, rather than because of a good-faith analysis of the relevant
legal materials. 1 Liberal law professors argue that conservative law
professors have thrown their lot in with originalism because the
original understanding lines up with the ideological goals of those
professors or can be manipulated to do so. 2 Critics of law and
economics argue that this methodology appeals to conservatives who
believe in free markets. 3 Defenders of law and economics have not
been shy about accusing their critics of left-wing ideological bias. 4 In
countless other debates, charges of ideological bias are common. 5 A
full account of the charges and counter-charges of ideological bias in
1 See, e.g., ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 199-219 (1997) (accusing
mainstream constitutional law professors of liberal bias).
2 Robert Post & Reva Siegal, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006) (arguing that conservatives
prefer originalism for ideological reasons). See generally Keith E. Whittington, Is
Originalism Too Conservative?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 29, 30 (2011) (“The
association of conservative politics with originalism is not accidental, however, and
conservatives are generally more likely than liberals to find originalism a
normatively attractive approach to constitutional interpretation.”).
3 MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 151 (1987) (law and
economics is “biased … because the people doing this work explicitly and
substantively favor certain traditional right-wing positions”).
4 Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757
(1975) (“The law and economics scholars have been scrupulous—more scrupulous I
would argue than their critics—in respecting the line between positive and
normative analysis.”).
5 See, e.g., Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A “Public Assets” Theory of
Lawyers' Pro Bono Obligations, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1294 (1997) (claiming
ideological bias motivated professor’s criticisms of pro bono lawyers); Michael L.
Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle over Waiver of the AttorneyClient Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, n 163 (2008) (claiming ideological bias
motivated argument that the Justice Department should reduce investigations of
corporations); Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing,
1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 244 (1999) (claiming ideological bias motivated argument
that better health insurance is the solution to the problem of bankruptcy); Lynne
Marie Kohm & Lynn D. Wardle, The “Echo-Chamber Effect” in Legal Education:
Considering Family Law Casebooks, 6 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 104 (2011)
(arguing that family law casebooks reflect ideological bias in favor of abortion
rights).
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law reviews could easily fill up the Internet, leaving no room for cat
videos.
Conservative scholars have also complained that law school
faculties are left-wing. A study by John L. McGinnis, Matthew
Schwartz, and Benjamin Tisdell found that law professors at the top
law schools who made political contributions overwhelmingly
contributed to Democratic candidates for political office. 6 One
commentator laments that lack of ideological diversity among law
professors leads to an “echo chamber” that prevents “an accurate
understanding of contemporary reality.” 7 If liberals predominate on
the faculty, and scholarship reflects ideological biases, then legal
research may advance a liberal world view rather than understanding
of the law.
Nor are these accusations restricted to academic work.
Professor David Hyman complains that the liberal bias of law
professors was reflected in their comments to journalists about the
constitutionality of the individual mandate of the Affordable Care
Act. 8 The law professors argued, in the strongest possible terms, that
the legal argument that the individual mandate violated the
Commerce Clause was not only wrong but “frivolous,” “silly,”
“deserving of sanctions,” “completely bogus,” and “beneath
contempt.” 9 Yet that challenge was received favorably by some
district and circuit courts, and prevailed in the Supreme Court in
NFIB v. Sebelius 10 by a 5-4 vote. Hyman believes that their
ideological priors led the law professors astray and thus that the legal
academy, because of its overwhelming liberal slant, misled
journalists and the public.
The political scientist Steven Teles places recent developments
in legal scholarship in an ideological framework. 11 In his telling, an
alliance of liberal law professors, liberal public-interest groups like
the ACLU, and liberal foundations like the Ford Foundation formed a
6 John L. McGinnis, Matthew Schwartz & Benjamin Tisdell, The Patterns and
Implications of Political Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 GEO. L.J.
1167, 1169 (2005).
7 George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Improved Intellectual Diversity in Law
Schools, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 165 (2013). See also Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, Intellectual Diversity in the Legal Academy, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 137 (2013).
8 David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits
against PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805.
9 Id. at 809-10.
10 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
11 STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008).
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“liberal legal network” in the 1970s that supported liberal legal
scholarship committed to defending Warren Court decisions:
The near-absence of conservative voices in law schools meant
that this interpretation of constitutional law was nearly
hegemonic. This was a “dominance so complete that every
casebook, treatise, and handbook used to teach constitutional
law in American law schools is the product of Democrats
writing from Democratic perspectives. 12
The liberal legal network eventually provoked a backlash among
conservatives. Legal scholars with a conservative or libertarian bent
organized their own institutions to nurture their scholarship—above
all, The Federalist Society. And they received significant financial
support for their research from right-leaning foundations. 13
In this paper, we attempt to test the link between ideology and
research using statistical methods. We have collected data on the
political propensities of a random sample of 156 tenured law
professors from elite law schools, and on the political slant of papers
that they have written in the last several years. We do in fact find that
the ideology of a tenured professor at an elite law school—as
measured by his or her contributions to candidates for political
office—is correlated at a statistically significant level with the
ideological valence of the professor’s research.
We are writing on a clean slate. As far as we know, no one has
conducted a statistical study of political bias among law professors.
There is also no comparable research in other fields. However, there
is some related work. In political science, we found one study that
shows that scholars who use different paradigms in international
relations (realist, liberal, etc.) tend to have different ideological views
based on responses to a survey. 14 Economists have produced several
studies of the ideological views of economists. In these studies,
authors use surveys to gauge economists’ political views and their
views about certain economic parameters, and then investigate the
relationships between them (typically finding a statistically
Id. at 45, quoting Martin Shapiro, Interest Groups and Supreme Court
Appointments, 84 NORTHWESTERN U.L. REV. 935, 955 (1990). For further
discussion, see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996).
13 Teles, supra note 11, at 265-74.
14 Brian Rathbun, Politics and Paradigm Preferences: The Implicit Ideology of
International Relations Scholars, 56 INT’L STUD. Q. 607 (2012) (finding a
relationship between international relations scholars’ choice of paradigm and
political beliefs).
12
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significant relationship). 15 But they have not tested whether political
views affect published articles. Psychologists have written extensively
about whether the lack of ideological diversity in their profession has
biased research. 16 Historians routinely argue that earlier generations
of historical scholarship reflect the ideological assumptions of the
age. 17
The absence of similar research on legal scholarship reflects
15
Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth & Gerald A. Epstein, Dangerous
interconnectedness: economists’ conflicts of interest, ideology and financial crisis,
36 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 43 (2012) (finding that economists proposing financial
reform measures frequently had, but only infrequently and inconsistently
disclosed, private financial affiliations); Victor R. Fuchs, Alan B. Krueger, & James
M. Poterba, Why do Economists Disagree About Policy?, NBER Working Paper
No. 6151 (1997) (finding a relationship between economists’ values and their best
estimates of economic parameters as well as their policy preferences); Thomas
Mayer, The Role of Ideology in Disagreements Among Economists: A
Quantitative Analysis, 8 J. ECON. METH. 253 (2001) (finding a relationship
between economists’ political ideology and their estimates of economic
parameters); Bryan Caplan, Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics:
Robust Evidence of Judgmental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and
Economists on the Economy, 112 THE ECON. J. 433 (2002) (rejecting the view that
self-serving or ideological biases among economists explain the differences of
opinion between economists and laypeople on economic questions); Roger Gordon
& Gordon B. Dahl, Views Among Economists: Professional Consensus or PointCounterpoint?, 10 AM. ECON. REV: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS 629 (2013) (finding
consensus among economists on many economic questions and no evidence that
ideological divisions explain disagreement on the others).
16 Yoel Inbar & Jorris Lammers, Political Diversity in Social and Personality
Psychology, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCI. 496 (2012) (finding that social
and personality psychologists overwhelmingly have liberal political beliefs and
some would discriminate against conservatives in professional decisions); Lee
Jussim, Liberal Privilege in Academic Psychology and the Social Sciences:
Commentary on Inbar & Lammers (2012), 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCIENCE 504 (2012) (arguing that the liberal political beliefs of social psychologists
distort research in the field); Linda J. Skitka, Multifaceted Problems: Liberal Bias
and the Need for Scientific Rigor in Self-Critical Research, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 508 (2012) (critiquing the methodology of the Inbar &
Lammers study); Richard E. Redding, Likes Attract: The Sociopolitical Groupthink
of (Social) Psychologists, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 512 (2012)
(arguing that ideological diversity in the field of psychology is important to
research and teaching); Deborah A. Prentice, Liberal Norms and Their
Discontents, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 516 (2012) (arguing that
liberal norms in the field of social psychology constrain the direction of research);
Philip E. Tetlock, Rational Versus Irrational Prejudices: How Problematic Is the
Ideological Lopsidedness of Social Psychology?, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 519 (2012) (arguing that liberal ideological biases may have
influenced research).
17
See, e.g., C. Behan McCullagh, Bias in Historical Description,
Interpretation, and Explanation, 39 HISTORY & THEORY 39 (2000).
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poorly on our field. And it is surprising in light of the massive
literature on judicial behavior, which uses statistical methods to
predict case outcomes from the ideologies of judges. 18 Indeed, we use
a methodology similar to that of the authors in that literature. So,
based on the principle that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the
gander, we turn now to legal academia.
I. RESEARCH DESIGN
A. Empirical Strategy
We use a simple empirical strategy modeled on the general
approach used in the judicial behavior literature. That literature tests
the hypothesis that case outcomes or votes are affected by the
ideology of judges. Authors have developed an elaborate coding
scheme for classifying a case outcome as “liberal” or “conservative.” 19
The ideology of a judge is usually based on the party affiliation of the
president who nominated her. 20 Thus, findings that judges
nominated by Democratic presidents vote more frequently for liberal
case outcomes than judges nominated by Republican presidents are
consistent with the hypothesis. 21
As explained in greater detail below, we use the same coding
See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN, ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES (2013).
See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the
Attitudinal Model (1993). The “U.S. Supreme Court Database,” initially created by
Harold Spaeth, is widely used in law and social science. Cf. Barry Friedman,
Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 272 n.10 (2006) (noting that the
database was cited 161 times between 2002 to 2006 alone). For a criticism of the
coding system developed and used by this widely cited database, see Carolyn
Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the
Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (2009).
20 See, e.g., Jonathan P. Kastellec, Hierarchical and Collegial Politics on the
U.S. Court of Appeals, 73 J. POL. 345 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein & Thomas J. Miles,
Symposium, Depoliticizing Administrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 2193, 2197 (2009);
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on
Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 303
(2004).
21 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Court of Appeals,
107 Yale L.J. 2155, 2168 (1998). See also Kastellec, supra note 20; Sunstein et al.,
supra note 20; Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997).
18
19
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system for classifying articles written by professors. Because
professors are not appointed by political officials, we instead rely on
their campaign contributions to infer their ideology. Although it is
possible that an individual’s political donations do not reflect his or
her true ideological commitments, they do have the advantage of
providing an objective and observable measure of preferences.
Moreover, donations are a widely used proxy for ideology in
empirical research. 22 Our hypothesis is that professors who
contribute to Democratic politicians are more likely to write liberal
articles than are professors who contribute to Republican politicians.
B. Data
1. The Sample
Each observation in our dataset is a professor. To choose our
professors, we drew our sample from the top 14 law schools in the
2015 U.S. News & World Report Rankings. 23 We then randomly
selected ten professors from each law school. 24 To ensure that the
See generally Adam Bonica, Ideology and Interests in the Political
Marketplace, 57 AM. J. POL. SCIENCE 294 (2013). See infra note 38.
23 The 2015 edition of the rankings were released in the spring of 2014. The top
14 law schools in those rankings are: (1) Yale Law School; (2) Harvard Law School;
(3) Stanford Law School; (4) Columbia Law School; (4) University of Chicago Law
School; (6) NYU School of Law; (7) University of Pennsylvania Law School; (8)
University of Virginia School of Law; (9) University of California, Berkeley, Boalt
Hall School of Law; (10) Duke University School of Law; (10) University of
Michigan Law School; (12) Northwestern University School of Law; (13) Cornell
Law School; and (13) Georgetown University Law Center. We focus on elite law
schools because other scholarship does as well. See, e.g., McGinnis et al., supra
note 6. Moreover, we decided to define elite law schools as the Top-14 law schools
in the U.S. News and World Report Rankings because it is the definition common
used in both academic scholarship and discourse more widely. See e.g., Maya Sen,
Is Justice Really Blind? Race and Appellate Review in US. Courts, Working Paper
(2013), available at <http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/msen/files/jpm_v13.pdf>
(last visited August 7, 2014). See also Wikipedia Entry on Law School Rankings,
available at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_school_rankings_in_the_United
_States#Schools_that_rank_in_the_top_14_.28aka_.22T14.22.29> (last visited
August 7, 2014). We of course acknowledge that the decision to focus on elite law
schools does mean that our findings may not be generalizable to the population of
all law professors. See infra Part III.A.
24 We used a five-step process to conduct our random draw of professors. First,
we downloaded a list of the current faculty from the website of each of the 14 law
schools in our sample. Second, we counted the number of professors at each
school. Third, we used a random number simulator to create a random list of
22
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professors included in our sample had sufficient time to develop a
body of scholarship to evaluate, we elected to include only tenured
academic faculty. 25 In six cases the professors we initially drew had
written fewer than five journal articles—which we believed to be too
few articles to allow for a confident assessment of the ideological
valence of their research—so we discarded them and replaced them
with an additional professor, chosen at random, from the same
schools. Thus, our initial dataset had 140 observations.
In the initial sample of 140 professors, however, only 8 had
donated more money to Republicans than Democrats (which is our
principle measure of ideology). 26 This is perhaps unsurprising given
prior research that has suggested that academics are skewed far to
the left, 27 that lawyers skew to the left as a profession, 28 and even
that legal academics skew to the left. 29 That said, we still believed
that 8 Republicans was too small a sample for drawing reliable
inferences, so we proceeded to oversample Republicans. To do so, we
used the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections
(DIME) developed by the political scientist, Adam Bonica. 30 Using
the DIME database, we searched for employees of the 14 law schools
in our sample who were net conservative donors, and who met our
criteria of being tenured academic scholars. This resulted in the
identification of an additional 16 Republican donors who were not
already in our sample. We added these 16 professors to our initial
numbers based on the number of professors each school. For example, Harvard
had 119 professors listed on their website, so we had a computer put the numbers 1
to 119 in random order (i.e. 47, 10, 91, 2, etc.). Fourth, we then took the professor
from our list that was listed in the place determined by the first ten randomly
generated numbers (i.e. if the first number was 47, we’d count down the published
faculty list to the 47th spot, then include that professor in our sample). Fifth, if a
professor was not a tenured doctrinal faculty member, we drew continued down
our randomly ordered list until we had 10 professors from each school.
25
We excluded Assistant Professors, Associate Professors, Emeritus
Professors, Clinical Professors, Visiting Assistant Professors, and Professors of the
Practice.
26 See infra Part I.B.3.
27 See Adam Bonica, Mapping The Ideological Marketplace, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI.
367 (2014).
28 See Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, Whom Does the Judiciary Represent?
Working Paper (2014) (on file with authors).
29 See McGinnis et al., supra note 6.
30 Adam Bonica, Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections:
Public version 1.0, available at ‹http://data.stanford.edu/dime> (last visited July
31, 2014). The DIME database provides data on over 100 million political
donations between 1979 to 2012 based on FEC filings. The reason that we were
able to find additional donations using this database is that it includes donations
from earlier years than opensecrets.com does.
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sample of 140 professors, resulting in a sample of 156 total
observations. 31
2.

The Dependent Variable

We first selected the five most recent articles published by
those professors, as of July 2014. 32 We selected articles published in
law reviews or peer-reviewed journals, and excluded book reviews
and popular writing. With a small number of exceptions where we
used our judgment, this process was straightforward.
We hired research assistants—five second-year law students—
to classify the articles. We instructed the research assistants to use
the coding system that has been developed by Spaeth et al., 33 and has
been used in numerous judicial behavior articles. 34 This coding
system matches case outcomes with plausible political indicators. For
example, criminal law cases in which the defendant prevails are
classified as liberal; if the government prevails, they are classified as
conservative. In civil rights cases, when women, gays and lesbians,
and African Americans prevail, the outcome is liberal; otherwise it is
conservative. When workers or consumers prevail over employers
and merchants, the case outcome is liberal; when businesses win, it is
conservative. The coding instructions are reproduced in Appendix 4.
31 All of the results reported in this paper use the sample of 156 professors. Our
results are robust, however, to only using the initial sample of 140 professors.
32 Although five articles is a small number compared to the body of work of
many scholars, we do not believe that sampling only a handful of articles
substantively biases our results. It is reasonable to assume that for every legal
academic, the political valiance of the articles she writes falls along some
distribution. If enough articles were sampled from each professor, it would be
possible to know the true distribution. By only sampling five articles, however, its
possible that we are coding articles that are not representative of that individual’s
true distribution. That said, it is likely the case that these errors are randomly
distributed. In other words, for some professors we will have coded five articles
that are more conservative than their overall body of work, and for other professors
we may have coded five articles that are more liberal than their overall body of
work. As long as there is not reason to think that there is systematic bias in one
direction—which we do not have reason to believe exists—this will not bias our
results.
33 See Harold J. Spaeth, Sara Benesh, Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey
A. Segal, & Theodore J. Ruger. 2013. Supreme Court Database, Version 2013
Release 01. URL: http://supremecourtdatabase.org. Last accessed: July 17,
2014. For the relevant page of the codebook describing the coding of cases, see
<http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=decisionDirection> (last visited
August 7, 2014).
34 See, e.g., Joseph Daniel Ura, Backlash and Legitimization: Macro Political
Response to Supreme Court Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 110 (2014).
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We also instructed the research assistants to state whether
they had high confidence or low confidence about any specific coding
decision. 35 Although we spot-checked the coders’ judgments, 36 and
did not always agree with them, we did not correct any of their
coding decisions. There is a significant risk of unconscious bias on
our part because we, unlike the coders, know the political views of
many of the authors. Thus, our dataset no doubt contains many
errors. As long as the errors in the coding are not correlated with our
treatment variables, the direction of our results will not be affected.
We do not believe that there is such a correlation because the coders
were not provided with data on the political donations of the authors,
and did not know the political views of the authors (perhaps aside
from one or two of the most prominent professors in the sample).
Accordingly, coding error will not bias our results but instead only
produce noise (that is, reduce the level of statistical significance). 37
Of the 780 articles in our dataset, 512 are liberal and 237 are
conservative. The research assistants were unable to code 31 articles
because they had no political valence. (We call these articles
“neutral.”) We encouraged the coders to classify the articles even if
they were unsure; these articles were also coded as low-confidence so
that they are treated as neutral in some of our regressions. Of the 780
articles in the sample, the political valence of 458 articles was coded
with high confidence and the political valence of 322 articles was
coded with low confidence.
We constructed our main dependent variable, which we call
“net conservative bias,” by taking the number of conservative articles
and subtracting the number of liberal articles. A professor who wrote
five liberal articles received a score of -5, while a professor who wrote
five conservative articles received a score of 5. A professor who wrote
3 liberal articles, 1 conservative article, and one unclassifiable article
received a score of -2.
Note that under this measure of bias, a professor who receives
a 0 score might be one who has written two liberal papers, two
35 Although the dependent variable for our primary analysis was calculated as
the net of all conservative articles (whether they were coded with high or low
confidence) minus all liberal articles (whether they were coded with high or low
confidence), during robustness checks we also use a measure of the dependent
variable that counts articles as neutral unless they were coded as conservative or
liberal with high confidence. See Part II.B.
36 We also asked some researchers to code the same articles to see if their views
matched (which they did to a considerable degree). For more on this test of intercoder reliability, see infra Part III.A.
37 For a discussion of possible sources of bias from our coding system, see infra
Part III.A.
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conservative papers, and one neutral paper, or one who has written
five neutral papers. We think it is reasonable to classify both of these
professors as unbiased. A paper that argues that the individual
mandate violates the Commerce Clause is not necessarily biased—it
may well be right. Thus, a professor who writes such a paper is not
necessarily biased. Our focus is on professors who consistently
produce liberal or conservative articles. An unbiased professor may
sometimes produce liberal articles, sometimes conservative articles,
and sometimes neutral articles.
3.

The Independent Variables

Our major independent variable is the political ideology of the
professors in our sample. We gathered information about campaign
contributions made by each of the professors in our dataset from the
opensecrets.org website. 38 The variable (“net donations”) is equal to
political contributions to Republicans minus political contributions
to Democrats. We also use dummy and logged versions of this
variable.
The first of these variables assumes that someone who gives
$10,000 to Republican candidates on net is ten times more
conservative than someone who gives $1,000 to Republican
candidates. The other variables weaken this assumption. The dummy
variable assumes that the intensity of ideology does not vary with the
size of the donation; the log variable assumes that the intensity of
ideology increases with the size of the donation but at a declining
rate. It is important to recognize a possible ambiguity here. A person
who makes no campaign donations is given a middle score of 0
regardless of whether she is apolitical or an ideologue who cannot
spare money for campaign contributions or is ideologically opposed
to making campaign contributions. We will address this issue when
we discuss our results.
38 The website is run by the Center for Responsive Politics, and makes the data
collected by the Federal Elections Commission on all political donations available
to the public. See OpenSecrets.org Donor Lookup, available at
<https://www.opensecrets.org/indivs/>
(last
visited
July
17,
2014).
Openserets.org has also been widely used as a source for political donation data in
academic research. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Adam Chilton, Supplying
Compliance: When and Why the United States Complies with WTO Decisions, 39
YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2014); Michael S. Rocca & Stacy B. Gordon,
Earmarks as a Means and an End: The Link Between Earmarks and Campaign
Contributions in The US House of Representatives, 75 J. POLITICS 241 (2013);
Nikhar Gaikwad, Presidential prospects, political Support, and Stock Market
Performance, 8 Q. J. POL. SCI. 451 (2013).
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Seventy-five of the professors in our dataset were net
Democratic donors. Only 24 professors were net Republican donors,
while 57 made no donation. The average net donation of a net
Democratic donor was $6,258, while the average net donation of a
net Republican donor was $6,200.
Finally, we use a number of control variables, several of which
are of interest. First, bias in research may reflect generational norms.
As more and more social scientists join the legal academy, academic
standards from other disciplines may increasingly influence legal
scholarship. To account for this, we collected the year that each
professor received his or her JD as a measure of age. 39 Second, and
related, it may be the case that scholars with PhDs write less
politically biased articles because their training encourages
objectivity and empiricism. To account for this, we coded whether
each scholar had a PhD and whether that PhD was in the social
sciences. Third, a wide range of research has revealed differences in
the political views of men and women. As a result, we coded the sex
of each professor in our sample.
II. RESULTS
A. Main Results
Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of our data. 40 The xaxis shows the natural log of net Republican donations (Republican
donations minus Democratic donations), so the negative values are
net Democratic donors. The y-axis shows the net conservative
valence of articles—positive numbers are net conservative articles
and the negative numbers are net liberal articles. The regression line
shows a clear slope upward, indicating that professors who make
greater contributions to Republicans also write more conservative
articles. Specifically, a net Democratic donor on average writes -2.63
39 For two sets of professors this information was unavailable and we were
forced to use a proxy. First, in a handful of cases, the law professors in our sample
did not have a J.D. or equivalent law degree. All of these professors, however, have
a Ph.D. For these professors, we used the year they received their Ph.D. for the JD
Year variable. Second, for one professor, despite extensive searching we were
unable to find the year that he or she received his or her JD degree. For this
professor, we used the year the bar was passed as a proxy for the JD Year variable.
40 Note that the regression line shown in the graph is a fit line that across the
entire data set. The regressions presented in Table 1 instead have coefficients
separately for net Democratic donors and net Republican donors. Also note that we
violate the laws of mathematics by treating ln(0) as if it equals zero.
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conservative articles (that is, +2.63 liberal articles), while a net
Republican donor on average writes 0.17 conservative articles. Nondonors write on average 1.44 liberal articles. 41
Figure 1: Net Conservative Articles by Political Donations

In addition to analyzing our data graphically, we also analyzed
it formally with multivariate regression. Table 1 provides our primary
regression results. For these regressions, the dependent variable is
once again the total number of net conservative articles (from -5,
which means all liberal articles, to +5, which means all conservative
articles). Recall that a score of -3 could mean that the author wrote 3
41

This information is also presented in a table in Appendix A.3.
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liberal articles and 2 neutral articles, or 5 liberal articles and 2
conservative articles. Our main treatment variables are the natural
log of net Democratic donations (Net Dem. Donations (ln)), and the
natural log of net Republican donations (Net Repub. Donations (ln)).
The first two models include these treatment variables alone; the last
three add various controls. All of the regressions presented in Table 1
use a linear probability model. 42
Table 1: Net Conservative Articles as a Function of
Donations
(1)
Net Dem. Donations (ln)

(2)

-0.194***
(0.063)

Net Repub. Donations (ln)

(4)

(5)

0.029
(0.024)
-0.964
(0.681)
0.385
(0.884)
1.614***
(0.601)

0.274***
(0.090)
0.044*
(0.024)
-0.662
(0.684)
0.425
(0.878)
1.531**
(0.601)

-0.115*
(0.069)
0.204**
(0.099)
0.037
(0.024)
-0.750
(0.682)
0.344
(0.874)
1.467**
(0.599)

156

156

156

-0.174***
(0.063)
0.303***
(0.088)

JD Year
PhD
PhD in Social Sciences
Male

Observations
156
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)

156

The results in Table 1 show that, regardless of the
specification, professors who make net donations to Democrats on
average write more liberal articles on net than the remaining nondonor and Republican professors do. Similarly, they show that net
Republican donors on average write more conservative articles than
non-donor and Democratic professors do. These results are all
42 Although our dependent variable is categorical, for our primary results we
have chosen to analyze the data using a linear model. This is simply because linear
probability models provide a fairly similar estimation to categorical models—like
ordered logit models—but the coefficients are dramatically easier to interpret. All
of the models presented in the body of the paper, however, were also estimated
using an ordered logit model (“o-logit”). These results are presented in Appendix 2.
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statistically significant. They are also substantively large. As noted
above, the average net Democratic donor writes 2.63 liberal articles
on net, while the average net Republican donor writes 0.17
conservative articles on net. One can also get a sense of magnitudes
by looking at marginal effects. 43 Model 5 indicates that the maximal
donor to Democrats writes 1.2 more liberal articles than the least
generous Democratic donor. The maximal donor to Republicans
writes 2.25 more conservative articles than the least generous
Republican donor. The only other independent variable that achieves
statistical significance is the sex variable. Male professors write fewer
liberal articles on net. Indeed, 23 of the 24 Republican donors in our
dataset are men.
The findings in Table 1 are robust to a range of additional
model specifications. In Table 2, we present regressions that use both
an alternative dependent variable and alternative treatment
variables. Model 1 reproduces Model 5 from Table 1 for the purpose
of comparison. But Model 2 uses an alternative dependent variable.
For this regression, the dependent variable was calculated based on
the articles for which our coders had “high” confidence in their
coding decisions (and counting all “low” confidence decisions as
neutral). 44 As the results show, changing the dependent variable in
this way had essentially no effect on our results.
As a further robustness check, Models 3 and 4 use an
alternative treatment variable. For these models the treatment
variable is a dummy variable (coded as 0 or 1) for whether a
professor was a Net Democratic Donor or a Net Republican Donor.
For Model 3, the dependent variable was calculated using all of the
coded articles in our sample, and for Model 4 was based on the
articles that were coded with high confidence. Once again, our results
remained statistically significant and nearly identical to the primary
results presented in Table 1. 45

The marginal effects were calculated by moving one variable from its
minimum to maximum value while holding all other covariates at their means.
44 For this dependent variable, all articles that were coded with low confidence
where counted as “neutral.” For example, if our coders determined that a professor
wrote 5 liberal articles, but only 2 of these articles were coded with high
confidence, under this coding the professor would have a score of -2.
45 Appendix B reports the results of all of the regressions reported in Table 2
while using an ordered logit model instead of a linear probability model.
43
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Table 2: Robustness Checks of Net Conservative Articles
as a Function of Donations

Net Dem. Donations (ln)
Net Repub. Donations (ln)

(1)
All
Coded
Articles

(2)
“High”
Confidence
Articles

-0.115*
(0.069)
0.204**
(0.099)

-0.116**
(0.054)
0.148*
(0.079)

Net Dem. Donor (dummy)
Net Repub. Donor (dummy)

(3)
All
Coded
Articles

(4)
“High”
Confidence
Articles

-1.081*
(0.550)
1.395*
(0.781)

-0.990**
(0.439)
0.944
(0.624)

Liberal CF Score

-0.003
(0.019)
-0.134
(0.541)
0.004
(0.694)
1.001**
(0.476)

0.039
(0.024)
-0.725
(0.679)
0.246
(0.876)
1.496**
(0.598)

-0.002
(0.019)
-0.112
(0.542)
-0.066
(0.699)
1.044**
(0.477)

-0.924**
(0.381)
2.265***
(0.807)
0.043*
(0.023)
-0.622
(0.664)
0.165
(0.871)
1.650***
(0.587)

156

156

156

156

Conservative CF Score
JD Year
PhD
PhD in Social Sciences
Male

0.037
(0.024)
-0.750
(0.682)
0.344
(0.874)
1.467**
(0.599)

Observations
156
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(5)
All
Coded
Articles

Finally, as a further robustness check, in Models 5 and 6 we
use yet another treatment variable. For these models, the treatment
variable is whether the professor had a liberal or conservative CF
Score. A CF Score is a measure of ideology created by Adam Bonica
that uses political donations data to determine the intensity of the
liberal or conservative views of donors based on the voting record of
the candidates they donated to. 46 Under Bonica’s system, a
46

See Bonica, supra note 22; Bonica, supra note 27: Bonica & Sen, supra note

(6)
“High”
Confidence
Articles

-0.702**
(0.306)
1.721***
(0.649)
0.003
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.533)
-0.106
(0.700)
1.167**
(0.472)
156
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Democratic donor who donated $1,000 to Dennis Kucinich receives a
more liberal score than a Democratic donor who donated $1,000 to
Hillary Clinton. Using this alternative treatment variable, our results
remain substantively the same. Having a more liberal CF Score is
associated with writing more liberal articles, and having a more
conservative CF Score is associated with writing more conservative
articles.
B. Using Additional Data to Determine Political Affiliation
One shortcoming of using political donations as a proxy for
ideology is that not everyone makes campaign contributions. In fact,
37% of the professors in our sample have not made a campaign
contribution (or one that was reported to the Federal Elections
Commission). It is likely that most non-donors have political
commitments. Moreover, our initial coding revealed only eight
Republican net donors, which weakened the statistical significance of
our net Republican variables in the previous regressions.
To address this concern, we decided to code the ideology of
the remaining 57 non-donor professors based on information
available on their CVs. We coded professors who had previously held
a political appointment as being a member of that political party (i.e.,
Bush appointees as Republicans, and Clinton or Obama appointees
as Democrats). Additionally, professors who had held an official
position with the Federalist Society were coded as Republicans, and
professors who have held an official position with the American
Constitution Society were coded as Democrats. 47 Finally, we coded
professors who had worked for right leaning think tanks—like CATO
or the American Enterprise Institute—as Republicans, and professors
who had worked for an international organization like the United
Nations as Democrats. Using this approach, we were able to code an
additional 28 professors as Democrats and an additional 12
professors as Republicans. Seventeen professors remained
unclassifiable.
We combined this new coding with our initial coding of
whether a professor was a Net Democratic Donor or a Net
Republican Donor to produce the new variables Democrat
(Adjusted) and Republican (Adjusted). To graphically depict this
28, Bonica, supra note 30.
47 We did not code anyone as a Democrat or Republican based on his or her
affiliation with these organizations if they had merely attended a conference or
spoken at an event.

18

POLITICAL BIAS IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

[11-Aug-14

relationship, Figure 2 uses the same approach as Figure 1, and plots
the relationship between these variables and our key dependent
variable: net conservative articles. As Figure 2 shows, there is a
strong relationship between (adjusted) political affiliation and the
political leanings of academic articles. In fact, the effect is only
stronger when using this approach.
Figure 2: Net Conservative Articles by Adjusted Political
Affiliation

Once again, we used multivariate regressions to analyze the
relationship between adjusted political ideology and the bias of each
author’s scholarship. To do so, we recreated Table 1 but used these
new treatment variables. The results from this analysis—which are
presented in Table 3—reveal that there is a statistically significant
relationship between ideology and the leanings of each authors’
scholarship. Moreover, the magnitudes of the effects are larger than
the results presented in Table 1. These results are additionally robust
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to all of the alternative specifications we presented in Table 2. 48
Table 3: Net Conservative Articles as a Function of
Adjusted Political Affiliation
(1)
Democrat (Adjusted)

(2)

-2.670***
(0.503)

Republican (Adjusted)

(4)

(5)

0.026
(0.023)
-0.823
(0.653)
0.193
(0.848)
1.207**
(0.586)

2.253***
(0.588)
0.036
(0.023)
-0.650
(0.670)
0.340
(0.864)
1.424**
(0.593)

-2.092**
(0.804)
0.476
(0.894)
0.027
(0.023)
-0.777
(0.660)
0.196
(0.850)
1.206**
(0.588)

156

156

156

-2.419***
(0.517)
2.544***
(0.580)

JD Year
PhD
PhD in Social Sciences
Male

Observations
156
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)

156

C. Do Republican Donors Write Less Ideologically Biased
Scholarship Than Democratic Donors Do?
According to our coding system, net Democratic donors write
highly ideological articles, whereas net Republican donors write
articles that are distributed widely across the spectrum. The average
net Democratic donor writes 2.63 liberal articles on net, while the
average article of a net Republican donor writes 0.17 conservative
articles on net, which is even closer to 0 than the number of article
written by non-donors, who on average write 1.44 liberal articles on
net. Figure 3 shows the distribution for Republicans and Democrats.
The modal net Democratic donor writes five out of five liberal
articles. Does this mean that Republican donors write less
ideologically biased scholarship than Democratic donors do?

48

The results of these robustness tests are presented in Appendix C.
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Figure 3: Ideological Valence of Articles Written by
Democratic and Republicans

Professors who are Democrats (adjusted)—shown in the left
panel—have an average article ideology of -2.67 with a 90%
confidence interval of -3.13 to -2.21. Using a t-test, we can say that
this is statistically different from zero (p-value < 0.00). Professors
who are Republicans (adjusted)—shown in the right panel—have an
average article ideology of 0.17 with a 90% confidence interval of 0.72 to 1.10. For these professors, we cannot reject the possibility
that the true net ideology of their articles is zero (p-value = 0.72). In
other words, our data suggest that Democrats in our sample do not
write articles that are on balance neutral, but that Republicans in our
sample may write articles that are on balance neutral. 49
These results, however, must be interpreted with caution for
several reasons. First, we have many fewer net Republican donors in
our dataset than Democrats and non-donors, and accordingly the
ideological distribution of the articles Republicans write may not
represent the entire population of Republican law professors.
Second, it is possible that the coding scheme encouraged our coders
to interpret articles to be more liberal than they in fact are. That
might explain why non-donors skew liberal. If we take the non-donor
scholarship as the neutral baseline, then the Republicans are almost
exactly as ideological as the Democrats are—the two groups are close
49 Forty percent of the articles written by Democrats (adjusted) could not be
classified with high confidence, 51 percent of articles written by Republicans
(adjusted) could not be classified with high confidence. If such articles are
“neutral,” then Republicans wrote substantially more neutral articles.
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to equidistant from the neutral score. Third, the distributions may
reflect the influence of constitutional law scholarship. Just by chance,
none of the net Republican donors in our dataset are constitutional
law scholars, and only one of the adjusted Republicans is. If
constitutional law scholarship is more ideological than other forms of
scholarship, 50 the different distributions may show that Democrats
are more likely to write constitutional law scholarship but not that
they are otherwise more likely to write ideologically than
Republicans. Fourth, it is in principle possible that background legal
and political circumstances justify what appears to be an ideological
tilt in scholarship. If Hitler were elected, and replaced the judiciary
with Nazi judges, while leaving the law schools alone, we suspect that
nearly all professors would write papers criticizing the judges’ rightwing jurisprudence, and rightly so.
With those caveats in mind, if it is in fact the case that
Republicans write less ideologically biased scholarship than
Democrats do, then one would naturally ask why. The most plausible
explanation is that if the dominant ethos in the top law schools is
liberal or left-wing, 51 then Republicans are likely to conceal their
ideological views in their writings. Republican professors might fear
that scholarship that appears conservative may be rejected by leftleaning law review editors, and disparaged or ignored by their
colleagues, which will damage their chances for promotions, research
money, and lateral appointments. This would explain why even nondonors tilt left. Republicans could suppress their ideological views by
avoiding controversial topics, taking refuge in fields that have little
ideological valence, focusing on empirical or analytical work, or
simply writing things that they don’t believe.
D. Differences Across Fields
Some readers may be interested in whether the research of
faculty at different law schools or working in different fields displays
different levels of ideological bias. Data limitations prevent us from
providing firm conclusions on these issues. Because we select only
ten law professors from each law school, and code the professor
based on only five articles, we are hesitant about drawing
A possibility that we explore in Section D, below.
As suggested by McGinnis et al., supra note 6. See also Adam Bonica & Maya
Sen, Whom Does the Judiciary Represent?, Working Paper (2014), at 16 (on file
with authors) (providing data that show that lawyers skew left and academics skew
left). The Bonica & Sen paper does not isolate legal academics.
50
51
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conclusions about whether specific law schools produce more
ideologically biased scholarship than other law schools. Such an
investigation would require more data.
However, we can shed some light on the question of whether
ideological bias differs in different areas of scholarship. The coding
categories in the judicial behavior literature do not track the fields of
legal scholarship perfectly, but there is a rough correspondence.
Under the Spaeth et al. coding scheme, legal opinions are divided
into one of six categories. We asked our coders to determine which of
these six categories was the closest fit for each article. If three of the
five articles a professor wrote were in the same category, we coded
that professor as writing in that category.
Cat.

1
2
3
4
5
6

Table 4: Ideologically Biased Research by Field
Description
# Dem # Rep # NonMean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Donors Donors Donors Net Dem Net Rep Conserv. Conserv
Donation Donation Articles Articles
by Dem by Rep
Donors Donors
Constitutional
20
1
5
8,095
1,650
-4.00
-1.00
Rights
Economic Activity
8
6
16
8,306
2,500
-2.25
1.00
& Unions
Judicial Power
3
1
0
4,183
4,550
-1.67
-1.00
Federalism
1
0
0
2,300
--5.00
-Federal Taxation
2
0
0
5,100
--1.00
-Miscellaneous
28
13
26
4,942
4,690
-2.18
-0.08

As Table 4 shows, category 1 corresponds roughly to
constitutional law scholarship that focuses on individual rights. Most
private law scholarship falls into category 2, which includes
economic activity, and category 6, which covers miscellaneous fields.
The data presented in Table 4 suggest that constitutional rights
scholars are less ideologically diverse than other legal scholars.
Among constitutional rights scholars, 77% are net Democratic
donors, and 4% are net Republican donors. In the rest of the sample,
40% are net Democratic donors, and 20% are net Republican donors.
It also shows that constitutional rights scholars are more likely to
produce biased research (mean of -3.85 conservative articles) than
Republican and Democratic scholars in other fields (mean of -1.35
conservative articles).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Qualifications
Before discussing the implications of our results, we should
acknowledge some possible statistical limitations of our study. First,
the generalizability of our results may be limited because our sample
is not representative in several ways. Our sample was drawn entirely
from professors at top-14 law schools, and it might be the case that
professors at other schools write scholarship that is less—or more—
biased. Additionally, our sample consists entirely of tenured,
academic faculty. Repeating our analysis on a sample of other types
of legal academics—like assistant professors—might produce
different results. Finally, we coded the five articles that professors
wrote most recently. It is possible that articles coded from different
periods would have different ideological slants.
Second, there are a number of possible problems with our
method of coding the bias of articles. One possible problem is that
the decisions made by our coders might skew liberal or conservative.
For example, a liberal coder might interpret “neutral” articles as
conservative because they are conservative from her perspective; or a
liberal coder might interpret “neutral” articles as liberal, because
they appear reasonable and she assumes that reasonable arguments
are liberal. Moreover, because our coders coded different groups of
articles, there may be inconsistencies in the coding across articles.
We are skeptical that this is a problem because coders were given
random samples of the articles, but we nonetheless took two steps to
address the issue: (a) we ran regressions that accounted for
differences between coders and found largely the same results; 52 and
(b) we asked multiple people to code the same article and found high
rates of consistency. 53
A further concern is that our coders’ judgments may have
been biased based on prior knowledge of the authors’ political
leanings. As previously noted, we do not believe that this is likely to
To do so, we estimated all of the regressions in Table 2 while including
“coder” fixed effects. This allowed for the possibility that there were systematic
differences between coders. This produced largely the same results as our baseline
regressions reported in Table 2 that did not include coder fixed effects.
53 We specifically asked a second coder to code a sample of 180 the 780 articles
in our dataset. Doing so revealed a high rate of inter-coder reliability. Our coders
made the same decisions 73% of the time, and when we relied exclusively on
decisions where both coders had high confidence in their decisions, the coders
made the same decision 92% of the time.
52
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be a significant problem because the coders were unlikely to have
previously heard of all but a few of the most prominent professors in
our sample. The exception, however, is that our coders are students
at the University of Chicago Law School and they are likely familiar
with a number of professors in the sample from the University of
Chicago. To account for that possibility, we replicated our analysis
while dropping Chicago faculty from out sample. After doing so, the
results were substantively the same. 54
Finally, the Spaeth et al. coding system was not designed with
law review articles in mind and is not a perfect fit. 55 Law review
articles are not judicial opinions, after all. We readily acknowledge
the possibility that coders were misled by the Spaeth et al. system,
but we do not think this problem is a serious one. Most law review
articles, like most cases, can be easily classified along ideological
lines—as favoring the government or criminal defendants, for
example, or as advocating an expansion of liability or a reduction of
it. Many law review articles are technical and hard to code; but that is
true for many cases as well, which can turn on complex questions of
jurisdiction that have no clear ideological valence. Our main effort to
address this problem was to ask our coders to code decisions with
either “low” or high” confidence.” As Models 2, 4, and 6
demonstrated, our results are robust to treating all articles where our
coders had low confidence as neutral. Beyond this empirical test,
however, we would argue that the use of the Spaeth et al. coding
system has an advantage because it was not designed with law review
articles in mind: it reduces the risk that a coding system that we
produced for our purposes might reflect our own unconscious biases.
In sum, these problems are real but their main effect should be to
add noise to our results—to reduce statistical significance—and not to
bias them.
Third, another concern is reverse causation, which in our
context would mean that professors (perhaps with an open mind)
write a number of articles about legal topics and discover pervasive
54 There are 11 professors from the University of Chicago Law School in our
sample. Of those 11, 10 were from our initial random sample and 1 was from our
attempt to oversample Republicans. See supra text accompanying notes 27 - 31.
After dropping these professors from our sample we estimated the regressions
reported in Table 2 with the remaining sample of 145 professors, which produced
results that were substantively similar.
55 It is important to note that it has been argued that the Speath et al. coding
system is not a perfect classification for legal cases. See Shapiro, supra note 19.
That said, despite these criticisms, the Speath coding system is the dominate
method used to study the ideological leanings of judicial decisions in the United
States.
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error in one ideological direction or another. Suppose, for example, a
professor decides to write about same-sex marriage and discovers
that courts repeatedly err, based on the professor’s best view of the
legal sources, by recognizing rights to same-sex marriage.
Accordingly, he comes to the view that too many ideologically liberal
judges sit on the bench, and starts making donations to Republican
political candidates in the hope that they will be elected and appoint
less ideologically biased judges. This story seems implausible. By the
time someone is old enough to receive tenure at a law school, that
person will almost certainly have well-defined if not rigid political
views. 56 Casual empiricism on our part indicates that law professors’
political views are established long before they start writing articles.
B. Interpretation of the Results
With those qualifications in mind, we turn to the
interpretation of our results. To reiterate, we find that law professors
who donate to Democrats write articles that are net liberal, and law
professors who donate to Republicans write articles that are net
conservative. Non-donors write articles that fall between these two
extremes. Numerous robustness checks confirm these results.
This could mean one (or both) of two things. First, a (say)
liberal professor might offer an interpretation of a legal text that
advances liberal values but is not the best interpretation of that text.
Let’s call this phenomenon “substantive bias.” Substantive bias could
be of two types. A professor may deliberately make arguments that
she knows to be wrong because she hopes to advance a political
agenda. Probably more common, a professor may sincerely believe
her biased argument because she has strong ideological priors that
influence how she interprets legal sources. In legal scholarship,
unlike the sciences, there are few, perhaps no, objective ways for
resolving disagreement; thus, there is much room for priors to
influence people’s sincere views about legal issues.
Second, the professor might search out research problems
where it happens to be the case that the correct outcome is liberal.
We call this phenomenon “selection bias.” Imagine, for example, that
56 Yair Ghitza & Andrew Gelman, The Great Society, Reagan’s Revolution, and
Generations of Presidential Voting, Working Paper (2014), available at
<http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/cohort_voting_2
0140605.pdf> (last visited July 17, 2014) (finding that the presidents that people
vote for is to a significant extent determined by the political events they witness as
teenagers and young adults).
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court #1 has wrongly interpreted statute A in a liberal direction, and
court #2 has wrongly interpreted unrelated statute B in a
conservative direction. A liberal professor might exercise selection
bias without engaging in substantive bias by writing an article
criticizing court #2 while ignoring court #1.
Another version of the selection bias story is that when
applicants for legal academic positions go on the job market, they
select a field in which they believe that they could make the most
important contributions, from a moral or ideological standpoint. For
example, a liberal applicant who believes that courts have failed to
provide adequate protection to criminal defendants may select
constitutional law or criminal procedure. This person would then
write left-leaning articles over the course of her career.
Our results are consistent with both types of bias—substantive
and selection. There is a parallel ambiguity in the judicial behavior
literature. The results in that literature are consistent with both a
substantive bias hypothesis that judges choose outcomes that
advance their ideological preferences (whether consciously or
unconsciously), and a selection bias hypothesis that politicians
appoint judges whose good-faith legal views happen to coincide with
the ideological preferences of the politicians.
The implications of each interpretation are different. As we
discuss in Section C, substantive bias is more troubling than selection
bias, which can be corrected if law schools hire faculty members with
diverse ideological views. It is less clear how substantive bias can be
corrected.
C. Implications
The purpose of our study is not to condemn law professors but
to provoke reflection about the role of ideology in legal scholarship.
We can imagine a few reactions to our findings.
1.

They don’t matter

Ever since legal realism, we have understood that legal
reasoning is not divorced from politics. It is natural and inevitable
that liberals and conservatives interpret legal sources differently. It is
a legitimate feature of legal scholarship that moral standpoints affect
legal conclusions. Consider, as a point of comparison, moral
philosophy or political theory. Liberals argue in favor of liberal
institutions because liberal institutions advance liberal values.
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Libertarians extol individual freedom; it is hardly surprising that
they are skeptical of government programs. Social conservatives
criticize abortion, secular education, and gay marriage because they
believe that these practices violate important moral values and erode
social solidarity. Legal scholarship is itself just a form of moral and
political debate that is focused on law rather than public policy
generally.
This may well be true. Ronald Dworkin famously argued that
the right judicial outcome must integrate legal sources and moral
principles. 57 But Dworkin never argued that the right legal answer
must conform to the (possibly mistaken) moral views of the judge or
academic. Even on Dworkin’s approach, the quality of a legal
argument is independent of the ideological bias of the person who
makes the argument.
Our view is that while some legal scholarship is openly
committed to advancing a specific political or ideological agenda, 58
most is not. Even in the most clearly normative articles, scholars
appeal to common values, constitutional norms, precedents, and
other sources that are “neutral” in the sense that everyone in
principle accepts them as sources of authority. If this were not the
case, then the frequent charge of ideological bias that law professors
fling at each other would make no sense.
2.

They cast doubt on the value of legal scholarship

Law professors are paid to do research, not to publish their
political opinions. Most legal research is presented as an objective
account of the law. When law professors criticize judicial opinions,
they almost always say or at least imply that the judges committed a
legal error. The claim that an error in legal reasoning exists should be
independent of the politics of the person who makes that claim. Just
as we criticize judges who allow their political opinions to influence
their interpretations of legal texts, we should criticize law professors
who allow their political opinions to influence their interpretations of
legal texts. In fact, we do this all the time. 59 Our findings suggest that
law professors often fail to satisfy a basic criterion of good
scholarship.
This argument raises difficult questions about what exactly
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (JACK M. BALKIN & REVA B. SIEGEL EDS.
2009) (discussing ways in advancing progressive values in constitutional law).
59 See supra notes 1 - 5.
57
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legal scholarship is supposed to accomplish. One possibility is that it
is supposed to improve our understanding of the law. If legal
scholarship were purely empirical or analytical, the charge of
ideological bias is troubling. Another possibility is that legal
scholarship is supposed to improve the world. As noted above, it
would not be surprising if normative scholarship reflects certain
ideological biases, but it is also the case that most normative
scholarship does not present itself as ideological argument but as
based on authoritative legal sources. A more appropriate
interpretation of our findings is that they raise questions about the
value of some legal scholarship, but certainly not all.
3.

Law faculties need “balance.”

Political bias in scholarship is inevitable; it is human nature.
Indeed, biases of various sorts infect all kinds of scholarship, even
the sciences. Consider for example, the ideologically tinged debates
about the role of genes in behavior. 60 Interaction and debate among
people with different views ensures that in the long run research
results will be objective. The appropriate response to our results is to
ensure that people with different political views are represented in
law schools. The lament that there are too few conservatives in the
law schools 61 (or at least too few conservatives who are ideologically
passionate enough to make donations and write conservative
articles) turns out to be a reasonable one, and we should correct this
problem by hiring more conservatives even if this means lowering
academic standards. For many people, however, this may be too high
a price to pay.
As noted earlier, a balanced faculty will be particularly helpful
if the selection bias hypothesis is correct. Balance would ensure that
law professors ferret out liberal biases in judicial opinions as well as
conservative biases in judicial opinions.
4.

Institutional fixes are available.

Most legal scholarship (including nearly all the articles in our
sample) is published in law reviews. It is possible that for many law
review editors, who are not experienced academics, the
persuasiveness of an article depends, at least in part, on its
See, e.g., Richard Dawkins, Sociobiology: The Debate Continues, NEW
SCIENTIST (Jan. 24, 1985).
61 See Dent, supra note 7
60
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consistency with their ideological priors. Imagine, for example, an
article that argues that same-sex marriage should receive
constitutional protection and an article that makes the contrary
argument. From a scholarly perspective, the first article should not
be published if it simply repeats arguments that have been made
before, while the second article should be published if it makes novel
and interesting arguments. Students with little knowledge of the
underlying literature might accept the first article and reject the
second because they find the ultimate conclusion of the first article
more persuasive than that of the second, based on their ideological
priors. Anticipating bias in the selection process, authors might
writes articles with an ideological tilt that they believe that students
will be receptive to.
Peer review might help address the problem of political bias in
the selection of articles for publication. Authors might hesitate about
making ideological claims if they know that experts in the field rather
than law students will evaluate their work. And while it is true that
many referees may share the author’s political biases, referees who
share authors’ ideological predispositions are likely to reject papers
that reflect a shared ideological bias if those papers are unoriginal,
fail to give credit to previous work, or are analytically flawed. For
these reasons, law reviews that do not already use peer review might
consider doing so.
CONCLUSION
Many law professors derive professional pride from their
influence on the development of the law. Law professors, unlike
other types of academics, directly influence the law by writing
articles that judges read and occasionally cite in judicial opinions.
However, if their articles are seen as “rationalizations of their
authors’ political ideology,” 62 they may well lose whatever influence
they have. Indeed, one court has expressed skepticism about
international law scholarship, noting that the “practice of relying on
international law scholars for summaries and evidence of customary
international law—that is, as secondary or ‘subsidiary’ sources of
international law—makes less sense today because much
contemporary international law scholarship is ‘characterized by
normative rather than positive argument, and by idealism and
See Richard A. Posner, The State of Legal Scholarship Today: A Comment
on Schlag, 97 GEO. L.J. 845, 853 (2009).
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advocacy.’” 63 We suspect that other judges take the same line on
constitutional law scholarship, and if such skepticism spreads, law
professors will lose influence on the development of the law. 64
It is important not to misinterpret our findings. Our empirical
results do not prove that all of legal scholarship is biased. Our coders
were unable to classify numerous articles with high confidence. Nor
do our results prove that law professors self-consciously generate
biased scholarship. Selection-effect mechanisms and reliance on
priors seem more plausible. Our findings raise rather than answer
questions about the relationship between ideology and scholarship,
and whether law faculties should be more ideologically diverse. But
we believe that our findings are strong enough results to justify
further research in this area.
We can see several directions in which research may proceed.
Our main concern is that the coding of the law review articles for
ideological valence may be inaccurate; there are no doubt other
approaches that could be used, including, for example, coding by
scholars rather than by students. Using a larger database, one could
determine whether ideological bias is more common in some areas of
legal scholarship than others—for example, normative versus
empirical scholarship, or public law versus private law. One might
also find (contrary to our results) that different types of training and
background lend themselves to different levels of ideological bias.
Other types of bias might be investigated—for example, bias
introduced into the work of law professors who consult and have a
financial interest in a specific outcome. Medical researchers have
attempted to determine whether financial interests have influenced
medical research. 65 Researchers should use our methodology—which
relies on coding of research rather than on surveys of academics’
beliefs—to investigate ideological bias in other areas of scholarship,
such as economics, history, and political science.
63 Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 251 n.26 (2003)
(quoting Remarks of Jack L. Goldsmith, Panel Discussion, Scholars in the
Construction and Critique of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 317,
318 (2000)).
64 See, e.g., Posner, supra 62.
65 Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li, & Cary P. Gross, Scope and Impact of Financial
Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 454 (2003)
(finding evidence of financial relationships between researchers and industry and
that those relationships can influence research results); Joel Lexchin, Lisa A Bero,
Benjamin Djulbegovic, & Otavio Clark, Pharmaceutical industry sponsorship and
research outcome and quality: systematic review, 326 BMJ 1167 (2003) (finding
that research on drugs sponsored by the drug’s maker was more likely to reach a
favorable result).
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APPENDIX
A. Summary Statistics

Democratic
Donors (net)
75

1. Breakdown of the Sample
No
Republican
Donations
Donors (net)
57
24

2. Summary Of Independent Variables
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Net Dem. Donations (ln)
Net Repub. Donations (ln)
Net Dem. Donor (dummy)
Net Repub. Donor (dummy
Liberal CF Score
Conservative CF Score
JD Year
PhD
PhD in Social Sciences
Male

3.71
1.19
0.48
0.15
0.45
0.12
1984
0.33
0.16
0.74

4.02
2.84
0.50
0.36
0.67
0.32
11.52
0.47
0.37
0.45

0
0
0
0
0
0
1960
0
0
0

Max
10.75
11.02
1
1
3.95
1.16
2007
1
1
1

3. Summary of the Dependent Variable by Donor Type
(All Coded Articles)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Net Dem. Donor
No Donations
Net Repub. Donor
Overall

-2.63
-1.44
0.17
-1.76

2.92
3.36
2.94
3.23

-5
-5
-5
-5

5
5
5
5
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4. Summary of the Dependent Variable by Donor Type
(“High Confidence” Articles)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Net Dem. Donor
No Donations
Net Repub. Donor
Overall

All Coding Decisions
High-Confidence Decisions

-2.11
-1.14
0.13
-1.41

2.31
2.68
2.25
2.55

5. Coding of Articles
Liberal
Don’t Know
512 (66%)
31 (4%)
330 (42%) 340 (44%)

-5
-5
-5
-5

Conservative
237 (30%)
110 (14%)

5
5
5
5

Total
780
780
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B. Robustness Checks Using Ordinal Logit (“O-Logit”) Model

Net Dem. Donations (ln)
Net Repub. Donations (ln)

(1)
All
Coded
Articles

(2)
“High”
Confidenc
e Articles

-0.068
(0.042)
0.119**
(0.057)

-0.088**
(0.042)
0.110*
(0.059)

Net Dem. Donor (dummy)
Net
Repub.
(dummy)

Donor

(3)
All
Coded
Articles

(4)
“High”
Confidenc
e Articles

-0.616*
(0.333)

-0.737**
(0.332)

0.823*
(0.448)

0.668
(0.460)

Liberal CF Score

(5)
All
Coded
Articles

(6)
“High”
Confidenc
e Articles

-0.495**
(0.231)
1.225***
(0.473)
0.005
(0.013)
0.149
(0.385)
-0.177
(0.502)
0.903**
(0.353)
156
O-Logit

0.024*
(0.014)
-0.135
(0.398)
-0.102
(0.509)
0.916**
(0.375)

0.001
(0.014)
0.058
(0.396)
-0.150
(0.501)
0.775**
(0.355)

0.025*
(0.014)
-0.124
(0.398)
-0.160
(0.512)
0.933**
(0.374)

0.002
(0.014)
0.075
(0.396)
-0.217
(0.504)
0.814**
(0.354)

-0.559**
(0.242)
1.247***
(0.468)
0.026*
(0.014)
-0.093
(0.387)
-0.091
(0.508)
0.986***
(0.373)

Observations
156
Model
O-Logit
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

156
O-Logit

156
O-Logit

156
O-Logit

156
O-Logit

Conservative CF Score
JD Year
PhD
PhD in Social Sciences
Male
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C. Robustness Checks Using Adjusted Political Affiliation

Democrat (Adjusted)
Republican (Adjusted)
JD Year
PhD
PhD in Social Sciences
Male

Observations
Model
-- Standard errors in parentheses
-- *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
All
Coded
Articles

(2)
“High”
Confidenc
e Articles

(3)
All
Coded
Articles

(4)
“High”
Confidenc
e Articles

-2.092**
(0.804)
0.476
(0.894)
0.027
(0.023)
-0.777
(0.660)
0.196
(0.850)
1.206**
(0.588)

-1.500**
(0.631)
0.880
(0.701)
-0.009
(0.018)
-0.082
(0.517)
-0.119
(0.667)
0.760
(0.461)

-1.172**
(0.484)
0.335
(0.530)
0.021
(0.014)
-0.179
(0.401)
-0.199
(0.521)
0.766**
(0.379)

-1.200**
(0.496)
0.583
(0.546)
-0.002
(0.014)
0.068
(0.395)
-0.243
(0.511)
0.630*
(0.357)

156
OLS

156
OLS

156
0-Logit

156
0-Logit
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